publishing, thus popularizing some of the knowledge that he had amassed in his library. As the chief Prague rabbi, he could also influence the work of the local Jewish presses. Indeed, he richly deserved the title that Teplitsky has chosen for this book.

Deutschland und die Sowjetunion 1933–1941. Dokumente aus russischen und deutschen Archiven, Volume 2 (January 1935-April 1937) in two parts. Edited by Sergei Slutsch and Carola Tischler, Oldenbourg, Germany, De Gruyter, 2019, 1781 pp., $260.00 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-3-11-054547-0

This second installment in the publication of a series of key documents regarding the relationship between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union is as massive as its first volume (also in two parts), which was published in 2013. By the time the fourth volume will be released, at some point in the 2020s, scholars can likely scrutinize some 8000 pages (in the German original or in German translation of the original Russian) in their efforts to chart the path that led to the invasion of the Soviet Union by a Nazi-led coalition on 22 June 1941. Documents on bilateral relations between Hitler’s and Stalin’s empire have, of course, been published before, but not in such exhaustive fashion. Even though an enormous amount of new material is presented to the reader, some documents are still missing, however. Researchers remain in the dark about certain files that even today are restricted or classified, such as many of those generated by or for Stalin’s Politburo, the Soviet security organs, or the Red Army and Navy, even if a number of such documents are presented here.

The editors have, especially, selected materials from the respective foreign-office archives, but they have, in addition, mined military and economic collections, as well as repositories on cultural and scientific connections. The picture conjured up from reading these massive volumes is fulsome, even if one mainly encounters the voices of the Soviet and Nazi elite. Typically, these leading circles both express themselves in the Newspeak developed by their respective ideologies in rendering their impressions and insights about their opponents and the political, economic, and cultural environment. The tone about the other side is usually hostile: Despite the ongoing trade (and trade-talks) between the two countries in the period from January 1935 to April 1937, no signs can yet be encountered of the stunning announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. Thus, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maksim Litvinov (1876–1951) writes in a memo to the Politburo of December 1935 of an “anti-Soviet campaign . . . of Homeric Proportions” enveloping Germany (864). Litvinov, who was Jewish, was perhaps more pessimistic about any rapprochement than some of the other Soviet diplomats, but few saw any promise of a real détente with Hitler’s regime throughout the 28 months in which the documents contained in these volumes were generated.

Nonetheless, the historian cannot avoid reading the documents in light of the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact. It is tempting to find forebodings of this treaty in such things as economic agreements, or in a change of tone on the part of deputy People’s Commissar of Defense Mikhail Tukhachevskii (1893–1937), as discerned by the German military attaché Ernst Köstring (1876–1953) in November 1935 (814). But such moments of mutual understanding...
or even sympathy seem brief non-sequiturs that were not part of any pattern on the part of either side to move toward a lessening of the tensions. And any friendly overture was usually quashed by the rapidly changing international situation, such as the takeover of the Saar region, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, or the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

It is odd, meanwhile, to observe the Nazi preoccupation with the Comintern, which had its seventh and final congress in the summer of 1935. Despite the fanfare around its new course of supporting left-wing coalition governments in democratic countries, the Communist International was in fact a rather limp organization, more a paper tiger than an international hub of revolutionary conspiracy. From many of the writings rendered here, it seems that the Nazis are well-nigh obsessed with the Comintern. For Hitler or Goebbels, the organization was an easy target to denounce, but its threat was largely a chimera in reality. It did perhaps come in useful as a foil, cementing alliances with other countries (Japan and Italy) that were more easily struck by means of an ostentatiously shared horror at an organization formally aimed at overthrowing the international order. Whereas Hitler and Goebbels might have been barely haunted by this specter, some of the lower level Nazis apparently took the threat more to heart, for a certain paranoia about it is palpable in some of the documents.

While the historian cannot shake seeing the documents presented here through the prism of the 1939 Pact, Stalin’s imminent Great Terror casts a shadow over the reading of these documents as well. Its first steps were the two show-trials staged in Moscow in August 1936 and January 1937. Indeed, in late 1935, one still finds high-ranking Central Committee official Karl Radek’s advice to Stalin on the consequences of the Ethiopian War and other current events abroad, but by January 1937, he stood trial confessing to his allegedly hidden Trotskyite essence. And many of the other Soviet protagonists of this volume would soon be killed on Stalin’s orders. Thus, Tukhachevsky was killed in May or June 1937, while N.N. Krestinskii, G.G. Yagoda, and A.A. Rosengol’ts would stand trial in March 1938.

For brevity’s sake, I have primarily limited myself above to outlining the significance of this collection through some telling documents of the late autumn of 1935. Those should already sufficiently indicate the great significance of this publication. The editors are to be applauded for their meticulous editing and annotation of the documents (and Tischler’s Einleitung [Introduction] is a feat of great erudition), as well as for supplying us a comprehensive index. Any research library, in my view, should purchase this collection, despite its prohibitive price. Given the size of the work, it is good value, even though few scholars will be able to afford to purchase for themselves the full set of books (in German, to boot), which will ultimately cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $1,000.

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Admiral Gorshkov: the man who challenged the U.S. navy, by Norman Polmar, Thomas A. Brooks and George E. Fedoroff, Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2019, 264 pp., $39.95 (hardback), ISBN: 978 1682 473306

This biography fills a gap in the historiography. While a crucial figure in Soviet naval history, no one has dedicated a monograph in English to Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (1910–